Strategic Advice in the Age of Personal AI

Personal AI assistants are changing how individuals use advice. We study how an advisor should design its recommendation in anticipation of stochastic consultation with personal AI whose recommendation is predictable. Personal AI enters through two dimensions: consultation probability and relative trust, which captures the relative influence personal AI receives when consulted. In the baseline model, the advisor optimally counteracts the personal AI signal. Counteraction increases with consultation probability but is hump-shaped in relative trust. The advisor's minimized loss is hump-shaped in consultation probability, vanishing when personal AI is never or always consulted. Greater relative trust in personal AI increases the irreducible loss arising from stochastic consultation. We extend the analysis to partial predictability and costly recommendation adjustment, characterizing their effects on optimal recommendations and minimized loss. The framework also accommodates richer information structures, including settings in which personal AI is perceived as having access to private information relevant to the task. We introduce an online forecasting experiment that examines how participants obtain personal AI advice and combine it with an advisor's recommendation and their initial judgments. Participants place weight on all three inputs. When access requires an additional action, some participants do not seek personal AI advice, while some others attempt to obtain it without success. Together, these findings highlight two distinct aspects of personal AI use: whether advice is obtained and how much weight it receives when available.

From arXiv